Politique commerciale, institutions et Groupes d’intérêt
Mots-clés :
Économie politique, Politique commerciale, Institutions, Groupes d’intérêtRésumé
Cet article propose une révision de la littérature sur la politique commerciale, à partir de deux déterminants princi-paux: les variations institutionnelles, qui répondent à deux agendas de recherche – la littérature sur le rapport entre les pouvoirs exécutif et législatif et les systèmes électoraux –, et un deuxième abordage qui analyse la performance de groupes d’intérêt. Cette révision initiale sert de subvention à l’analyse du cas brésilien en ce qui concerne à la prise de décision dans le secteur de politique commerciale.
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Références
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