Política comercial, instituições e grupos de interesse
Palavras-chave:
Economia política, Política comercial, Instituições, Grupos de interesseResumo
Este artigo faz uma revisão da literatura sobre política comercial, a partir de dois determinantes principais: as variações institucionais, que dão conta de duas agendas de pesquisa – a literatura sobre a relação Executivo-Legislativo e sistemas eleitorais –, e uma segunda abordagem que discute a atuação de grupos de interesse. Essa revisão inicial serve de subsí-dio para a análise do caso brasileiro no que tange à tomada de decisão na área de política comercial.
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