Críticas à teoria da escolha racional e hierarquias de conhecimento na ciência política
Palabras clave:
Teoria da Escolha Racional, Modelos Formais, Hierarquias do ConhecimentoResumen
A teoria da escolha racional tornou-se anátema na ciência política contemporânea. Desde os primeiros modelos de escolha racional, os teóricos dessa linha são criticados pelo conteúdo epistemológico de seus trabalhos, bem como pelo recurso a modelos formais como abordagem metodológica dos fenômenos políticos. As críticas reverberam em diferentes disciplinas, nomeadamente psicologia, economia e ciência política. Este artigo reconstrói os debates na área de ciências comportamentais e cognitivas, e na própria disciplina de ciência política, buscando compreender como eles se desenvolveram. O artigo também apresenta dados bibliométricos sobre a produção recente em teoria da escolha racional e discute como eles revelam hierarquias do conhecimento sobre a alegada proeminência de modelos de escolha racional nos principais periódicos de ciência política.
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