Critiques of rational choice theory and hierarchies of knowledge in political science
Keywords:
Rational Choice Theory, Formal Models, Hierarchies of knowledgeAbstract
The rational choice theory has become an anathema in contemporary political science. Ever since the first models of rational choice were created, theorists of this line are criticized by the epistemological content of their studies, as well as by the use of formal models as the methodological approach of political phenomena. The criticism occurs in different disciplines, namely psychology, economics and political science. This article reconstructs the debates that occurred within behavioral and cognitive sciences, as well as in political science itself, seeking to understand how they were developed. This article also presents bibliometric data on the recent production in rational choice theory and discusses how they reveal hierarchies of knowledge about the alleged prominence of rational choice models in the major political science journals.
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