Domestic politics and the United States foreign trade policy
state-of-art and theoretical possibilities
Keywords:
Foreign Trade Policy, United States, Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Political EconomyAbstract
Analyses of the United States foreign trade policy tend to progressively consider aspects of domestic politics. In view of that, this article makes a literature review of the approaches that are used the most for the analysis of foreign trade policy in the United States and that are focused on domestic politics, namely, preference and institutions-based ap-proaches and the ones focused on the executive and the president. Given the fragmentation of the foreign trade policy decision-making in the US, the existing models have difficulties to deal with the complex nature of the theme while keeping theoretical parsimony. After the literature review, the article points out to some theoretical possibilities and models that can be taken from the literature of public policy and foreign policy analysis to be used in the analysis of foreign trade policy, and that are called in this article coalition-centered approaches.
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