Política doméstica e política externa comercial nos Estados Unidos
estado da arte e possibilidades teóricas
Palavras-chave:
Política Externa Comercial, Estados Unidos, Política Doméstica, Análise de Política Externa; Economia Política InternacionalResumo
Análises de política externa comercial nos Estados Unidos tendem cada vez mais a levar em consideração aspectos de política doméstica. Em vista disso, este artigo faz uma revisão bibliográfica das abordagens mais amplamente usadas para a análise da política externa comercial dos Estados Unidos com foco na política doméstica: abordagens centradas em preferências e instituições e no Executivo e Presidente. A partir da grande fragmentação do processo decisório em política externa comercial nos EUA, os modelos atualmente existentes apresentam dificuldades em tratar do caráter complexo do tema e manter a parcimônia teórica. Como resultado, este artigo aponta possibilidades teóricas referentes a modelos que podem ser emprestados da literatura de políticas públicas e análise de política externa, chamados aqui de abordagens centradas em coalizões.
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