Intérêts et des institutions dans les théories de la régulation
une synthèse difficile
Mots-clés :
Théorie de la capture, Néo-institutionnalisme, Intérêts, Institutions, RégulationRésumé
Cet article fait un bilan bibliographique sur certaines approches qui cherchait à expliquer le phénomène de la régulation. Le premier cadre théorique qu’on prend est la théorie économique de la régulation (ou théorie de la capture), qui a pris naissance dans l’Economie, était très en vogue dans les années 1970, et dont l’objectif était de montrer la manière comment les groupes économiques a formé la régulation à leurs intérêts. L’autre corps théorique de la régulation qu’on met en évidence, et qui est ancrée dans la Science Politique, est la théorie positive des institutions (relation agent-principal), moins axée sur les intérêts sociaux et plus intéressée à comprendre comment les mécanismes de contrôle expliquaient les résultats politiques. L’objectif de cet article est de discuter les deux théories, pointant les avancées et les limites. Face à eux, nous avons identifié que le binôme « intérêts » et « institutions » s’excelle et délimite les principaux points des approches théoriques. En ce sens, nous analysons en détail le rôle de ces variables dans chaque chaîne théorique. En réalisant cet examen, on révèle que la Science Politique ne donne pas l’attention voulue aux intérêts et aux groupes sociaux dans leurs explications sur les politiques publiques (régulatoires). À la fin, un brin récente de la Science Politique américaine qui vise à dépasser cet écart, en mettant l’accent sur le rôle des groupes d’intérêt dans la régulation gouvernementale. On souligne dans le texte, en particulier pour la Science Politique, d’étudier mieux le lien entre « intérêts » et « institutions », afin d’obtenir une explication plus précise de la réalité.
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Références
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