Interests and institutions in regulation theories
a hard synthesis
Keywords:
Capture theory, New institutionalism, Interests, Institutions, RegulationAbstract
This article discusses some academic literature approaches that have sought to explain the regulation phenomenon. The first theoretical approach is the theory of economic regulation, or regulatory capture theory, which has its roots in Economy, was very popular in the 1970s, and focused on showing how economic groups shaped the regulation according to their interests. The other regulatory theoretical approach we discuss, which has its roots in Political Science, is the positive political theory of institutions (principal-agent problem). This theory is less focused on social concerns and more interested in understanding how control mechanisms explained political results. The goal of this article is to assess these two theories, pointing out some of their contributions and limitations. By comparing them, we identified that the terms “interests” and “institutions” stand out and delimit the main arguments of both theoretical approaches. In this sense, we analyzed in detail the role of these variables in each analytical framework. While conducting this analysis, it is revealed that Political Science has not given the proper attention to interests and social groups in its explanations about (regulatory) public policies. At the end, we present a recent approach from the American Political Science that tries to overcome this gap by emphasizing the role of interest groups in government regulation. The text emphasizes the importance, especially for Political Science, to better evaluate the relation between “interests” and “institutions” in order to achieve a more accurate explanation of the reality.
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