Théories du Crime et de la Violence
une révision de la littérature
Mots-clés :
Criminalité, Criminalité, Violence, Délinquance et théoriesRésumé
Il existe de nombreuses théories qui tentent d’expliquer les causes de la violence. Certaines sont devenues des théories de référence dans les études préparées dans d’importantes écoles de criminologie, telles l’École de Chicago. Ce travail aborde certaines des théories majeures, explicatives de la criminalité, de la délinquance et de la violence. L’objectif central de l’article est de proposer une révision de la littérature, particulièrement l’internationale, en mettant en avant aussi bien les théories sociales du crime et de la violence, telle la théorie de l’apprentissage social développée par Edwin Sutherland au début du siècle dernier, que les théories économiques basés sur un calcul stratégique de l’acteur criminel. C’est le cas de la théorie du Choix Rationnel et la Broken Windows, dont des auteurs tels Gary Becker, James Wilson et George Kelling, ont eu une importante production fondée sur des théories rationnelles du crime et de la violence.
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Références
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