Teorias do crime e da violência
uma revisão da literatura
Palavras-chave:
Crime, Criminalidade, Violência, Delinquência , TeoriasResumo
Existem muitas teorias que tentam explicar as causas da violência, com algumas se tornando referência em estudos elaborados em importantes escolas criminológicas, como a Escola de Chicago. Neste trabalho discuto algumas das principais teorias explicativas da criminalidade, delinquência e violência, e o objetivo central do artigo é trazer uma revisão da literatura, sobretudo a internacional, destacando desde teorias sociais do crime e da violência, como a teoria do aprendizado social desenvolvida por Edwin Sutherland no início do século passado, até as teorias econômicas baseadas num cálculo estratégico do ator criminoso, como a Teoria da Escolha Racional e a Broken Windows, que tiveram em autores como Gary Becker, James Wilson e George Kelling produções importantes com base em teorias racionais do crime e da violência.
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Referências
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