Coalizões internacionais
revisão da literatura e propostas para uma agenda de pesquisa
Palavras-chave:
Coalizões internacionais, Política doméstica, Países em desenvolvimento, OMC, Agenda de pesquisaResumo
A literatura de coalizões internacionais presta pouca atenção à cooperação entre os países em desenvol-vimento e negligencia a análise da política doméstica para entender os resultados das barganhas que envolvem estas nações. Essas lacunas decorrem: (1) do crescente, mas ainda novo, destaque obtido por esses países em fóruns multilaterais, como, por exemplo, na Organização Mundial de Comércio (OMC); (2) da crença teórica de que as ações dos países em desenvolvimento são irrelevantes para o entendimento das relações internacionais; e (3) da ênfase das teorias tradicionais sobre coalizões em temas de segurança militar, que é menos permeável às demandas de grupos domésticos. Este artigo proporá uma agenda de pesquisa acerca desse assunto.
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