Remarques sur les formulations du principe de tolérance religieuse
Mots-clés :
Tolérance Religieuse, Libéralisme Politique, Justification Publique, Raison PubliqueRésumé
Cet article analyse le rôle et les limites normatives de la religion dans les societés démocratiques libérales. Nombre de théories, dites « exclusivistes », trouvent leur inspiration dans l’idée que les valeurs religieuses ne seraient pas légitimes à la justification publique de lois coercitives. De l’autre côté, d’après les théoriciens dits « inclusivistes » les institutions religieuses seraient plutôt l’une des responsables pour former l’engagement civique d’un citoyen (religieux). Une question implicite dans cette recherche c’est de savoir si un citoyen (religieux), en justifiant une lois publique, doit s’accorder aux principes politiques de justice. Cette question nous exige définir un domaine d’affaires publiques dans lequel tous les citoyens, religieux ou non, doivent suivre un critère normative d’acceptabilité universel avant d’offrir leur raison, afin de faire accord du système de tolérance en question.
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