Contribuições de campanha
problemas e dificuldades da agenda de pesquisa quantitativa
Palavras-chave:
Contribuições de campanha, Decisões públicas, Pesquisa empírica, Metodologia quantitativa, Quase-experimentosResumo
Contribuições de campanha afetam decisões públicas ou a atuação pós-eleitoral de atores políticos? A pesquisa empí-rica quantitativa em Ciência Política debate esta questão há bastante tempo. No entanto, as respostas obtidas foram, em geral, ambíguas. Sustenta-se aqui que essa ambiguidade deve-se, em parte, a dificuldades práticas e metodológicas – muitas vezes mal-endereçadas – enfrentadas pelos analistas. Neste trabalho, procuramos mostrar como os pesquisa-dores lidaram com essas dificuldades através do tempo e propomos a utilização de desenhos de pesquisa que procuram se beneficiar de situações que se aproximam de experimentos, para mitigá-las.
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Referências
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